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Directions
John Howard, the opposition industrial relations 
spokesperson, would be a key figure in a Hezvson 
government. David Burchell spoke to him about unions, 
liberalism and the New Zealand model.
et me first ask you about your own 
portfolio responsibility, industrial 
relations. The Coalition's industrial 
relations policy since 1986 has been 
based around the ideas of voluntary enterprise 
agreements and 'opting out'. However, more 
recently there has been talk about moving closer 
to the full-blown deregulated New Zealand in­
dustrial relations model. There was a suggestion 
that this idea might have come from John Hew- 
son himself when he was in New Zealand a while 
back. What do you think of the New Zealand 
industrial relations model?
There are a lot of things in the New Zealand legislation that 
I agree with, but I don't see that legislation as a model for 
us. New Zealand is a different country. Unlike them, we
won't be abolishing the Industrial Relations Commission 
(IRC). We will be providing people with an alternative to 
the IRC—I would describe it as a preferred alternative. I'm 
not a slave to the New Zealand model, in fact I've gone out 
of my way to make the point that we shouldn't tie oursel­
ves to what is happening in any other country. I haven't 
been to New Zealand recently, but I'm studying what's 
happening there, and the most recent evidence suggests 
that there are many examples of big productivity gains 
from their new policy.'
The crucial difference between the New Zealand 
government's policy and the Coalition's policy here at 
present seems to be that you would be giving employees 
the option to stay within the industrial relations system, 
even if the preferred option is for them to get out of it.
We are proposing a situation where both sides can stay in 
if they want to or go out if they want to. We are considering 
a mechanism to deal with cases where there's a disagree-
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ment between the players as to whether they want to go in 
or not, although we haven't actually announced that 
mechanism yet. There is quite a difference between our 
approach and the New Zealand approach—not that I'm 
critical of their approach, it's just that what is necessary for 
Australia is different to what is necessary and acceptable 
in New Zealand.
So what is it about Australia that makes the New Zealand 
model in some respects inappropriate?
we adopted deregulated industrial relations as a policy 
before the New Zealand National Party did, so I suppose 
in a sense they've followed us and not the other way 
around.
You mentioned earlier that the Opposition was going to 
introduce a mechanism to deal with a situation where 
employees and employers in a particular enterprise 
couldn't agree on which way to go. The recent dispute in 
Bumie would seem to suggest that that would be a big 
problem under your policy.
We just have a different cultural background. We are a 
federation; New Zealand is a unitary state. The hybrid 
nature of industrial relations in Australia has always been 
one of its more compelling idiosyncrasies.
One thing that people often cite as a reason why the New 
Zealand policy might not work here is that the union 
movement here is more powerful.
^ might be more powerful. The point is that I haven't set 
out to model our policy on the New Zealand one— in fact
But Bumie wasn't an argument about whether or not they 
were going to go in or out of the system, because at the 
moment there isn't that option; you can't go out of the 
system, except to a limited degree in NSW. You certainly 
can't in Tasmania.
Yes, but how would the Coalition policy deal with a 
situation like that if it arose under a Coalition govern­
ment?
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Well, of course, that dispute would never have arisen...
The present Coalition policy is supposed to be voluntary 
and non-coercive. But isn't it actually premised on the 
assumption that unions are going to be weakened, in 
order to make the policy work?
Unions will lose some of the legal privileges that they now 
have. I've never disguised that fact. The present system is 
characterised by the fact that the unions have a bargaining 
monopoly—and we don't believe that's right. But we 
won't be seeking to take away from unions their capacity 
to organise and proselytise and get a big market share, and 
to play a very legitimate and vigorous role in industrial 
relations. We won't be preventing people from joining 
unions; they'll still be able to deduct their union dues from 
tax. People will be able to use unions as bargaining agents 
when they are negotiating voluntary agreements.
The one thing that will disappear under our policy is the 
legal monopoly over bargaining which is currently given 
to the unions. Under the present system it is not possible 
to enter directly into a contractual arrangement with your 
employer as to how you are employed and the terms and 
conditions under which you are employed. We think you 
should have the right to do that if you wish, so we're going 
to take away that bargaining monopoly. But in other 
respects we're going to acknowledge the role of unions. 
The policy is not primarily a union-bashing or anti-union 
policy. If it were it would fail in its objective.
In a recent article in the Current Affairs Bulletin  you said 
that "the abolition of compulsory unionism could also 
be expected to weaken the existing award system and 
promote voluntary agreements between employers and 
employees, by reducing trade union membership and by 
putting an end to closed-shop arrangements and union 
preferences". You do seem to be implying in those words 
that a reduction in the unionisation of the workforce is 
the necessary prerequisite for the successful exercise of 
the Coalition's industrial relations policies.
I thought that was really just a statement of fact. If you 
abolish compulsory unionism, while you may well see an 
extraordinary renaissance of the proselytising capacity of 
unions, you will see some reduction in levels of union 
membership. But it's not a primary objective. I have always 
acknowledged that there will be a reduction of union 
power. The major thing that will disappear is the bargain­
ing monopoly they now have. The fact that you have to go 
through a union, whether you like it or not, in order to have 
your terms and conditions fixed, is the most compelling 
feature of our present system. It's unique. There's no sys­
tem in the world quite as tender towards the position of 
unions as that.
Australia is also more or less unique in having a peculiar 
form of arbitration.
Yes, but the peculiar form manifests itself in that particular 
thing, the bargaining monopoly. What is basically being 
said is that individual workers cannot be trusted to make
judgements about their own well-being, that they have to 
have it done for them. I regard that as insufferably pater­
nalistic.
On the one hand, Australia is to some extent peculiar in 
having this industrial relations and arbitration system. 
But on the other hand, within Australian law there is less 
legal protection for unions and unionists involved in 
industrial disputes than in most other countries.
I wouldn't agree with that The bargaining monopoly that 
unions have gives them an enormous power.
But it's not a legally-based power, is it?
Yes it is, because it is not legally possible, except to the 
limited degree it's occurred in NSW, to just go out and 
make a deal with your employer.
If you remove the compulsory nature of the industrial 
relations system, what then is left to protect the legal 
rights of unions and unionists?
Within our policy there will be a number of legal minima. 
There ^vill be a legal minimum hourly rate of pay. There 
will be a minimum relating to annual leave and sick leave. 
The sort of things that we envisage ought to be negotiated 
are the length of the working week, penalty rates, redun­
dancy, holiday loading—those are the sort of things that 
we believe, if you're outside the system, ought to be mat­
ters for negotiation. But there will be certain prescribed 
minima, below which nobody can fall.
Yet surely it's difficult for the union movement to ignore 
one fact. Once what you describe as the monopoly power 
of the unions is withdrawn, and once the overall power 
of unions is reduced, and also given that following your 
model you would positively encourage the increase in 
enterprise unions, it's very difficult to imagine how 
voluntary enterprise agreements within this environ­
ment aren't going to be heavily biased in favour of the 
employer and against the employees.
I don't agree with that. It will depend a lot on the general 
state of the economy, and on the state of the particular 
industry. Many employers will probably elect to continue 
being covered by an award, rather than to go into a con­
tract, because they will have a fully-functioning arrange­
ment with their workforce, and they will deem it better 
business and industrial sense to remain that way.
But on the other hand you would imagine that voluntary 
employment agreements would be more likely to hap­
pen in workplaces where the workforce is actually strong 
and confident of what it could get outside the system, 
rather than in other workplaces.
Well, I think in some cases strong unions will see voluntary 
agreements as a good thing. You're saying that you can 
have a disparate balance of power, irrespective of the 
formal legal structure—well, that's right, you can. In­
dustrial power doesn't flow solely from legal positions
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under legislation, but they can nevertheless have quite an 
influence. They're not irrelevant.
Surely, though, it's hard to imaging how you could im­
plement this policy without it involving pretty high 
levels of industrial disputes, assuming that the economy 
becomes relatively buoyant again in the forseeable fu­
ture.
Oh, I'm more optimistic than that...
Let me ask you about the agenda after the next election. 
A Hewson government is pledged to make what some 
people have claimed are more dramatic changes to 
Australian politics and society than any other govern­
ment in recent memory. Traditionally the Australian elec­
torate has been quite suspicious of radicalism, which has 
more often been depicted as coming from the Left than 
from the Right. How do you think it will respond to your 
kind of radicalism?
They're still marching to the same drumbeat, though. The 
differences are in personality and style, rather than com­
mitment. M ajor has continued the sh ift tow ards 
meritocracy in the Tory party, as distinct from the noblesse 
oblige which characterised Tory paternalism, and in that 
way he's very similar to Thatcher. Certainly Bush is a man 
who has changed his views on political issues over the 
years, rather more, probably, than either Major or Thatcher, 
but they're still essentially moving in the same direction.
The centre of gravity in politics in liberal democracies 
shifted dramatically to the Right in the 80s. And while there 
may have been a little bit of stepping back and a little bit 
of fluffing at the edges, that centre of gravity has not gone 
back in a big way. Nobody's talking about reversing 
Thatcher's privatisation proposals. Nobody's talking 
about reversing her union changes. Nobody's talking 
about reversing her fundamental tax changes. Nobody's 
talking about reversing the sale of public housing. The big 
changes Thatcher brought in remain there.
In that sense Australia is just mirroring the rest of the 
world, in which the radicalism of the Right has been the 
dominant theme in other countries, certainly in the UK and 
the US, and a number of other European societies. There's 
nothing new in the democratic world in our lifetime about 
radicalism from the centre-Right. Of course in New 
Zealand, you've had economic radicalism both from the 
Left and the centre-Right.
Some people would say in Australia as well.
Of course they would. We've been talking about a clutch 
of very big economic reforms for a long time now—the 
most important of which are the industrial relations 
reforms. We've been talking about that now for seven or 
eight years. The first time it was seriously articulated by 
people on our side of politics was when I made a speech to 
the National Press Club after to the Budget in 1983.1 said 
we had to turn Mr Justice Higgins on his head, and that 
really started the debate on people being able to opt out, at 
a political level.
There wasn't much support for that then; there was a lot of 
opposition to it from within the Liberal Party at that time, 
and in the business community, as well as the union move­
ment. But over the years, opinion has shifted enormously. 
As for our ideas on indirect taxation, there's nothing new 
about a GST—what is new is that one party is uncom­
promisingly committed to it. I tried to get the Fraser 
government to introduce a GST, and he knocked me back. 
So we're not talking about things that have never been 
thought about or tried.
Many people would say that the radical Right tide was at 
greatest in the 1980s, and that now in fact it's ebbing. 
That certainly seems to be the case in Britain, where John 
"lajor has distanced himself increasingly from the legacy 
inherited from Thatcher. Also I would have thought 
^ t  in America George Bush has distanced himself from 
Reagan legacy.
‘There’s nothing new about 
radicalism from the 
centre-Right”
But given all that, and given as you say that there's hardly 
been a big swing to the Left around the world, neverthe­
less there has been a discernible change of rhetoric and 
of tone.
Yes, I think there has been some change of rhetoric, and 
that's not really surprising to me; politics works that way. 
You never want to become too great a slave to international 
comparisons, and Australia is not the same society as 
America or Britain—it's somewhere in between.
There's only really been one sustained example of a 
Coalition government in Australia attempting to put in 
place policies which resemble the federal Coalition's— 
and that's NSW. In the last few weeks John Fahey, the 
new premier of NSW, has been making noises that sound 
like a similar sort of move away from Greinerism that 
Major has been taking away from Thatcherism.
It's too early to know whether there's any significance in 
that. He has certainly encouraged the Liberal Party to talk 
in less clinical language, but party figures on both sides 
would periodically do that. I remember that doyen of the 
Left, Senator Richardson, saying some years ago that 
nobody understood what Hawke and Keating were 
saying, because they were talking in economic jargon. But 
we'll have to wait and see about Fahey, it's too early to 
know. So far, all that he's said could simply be interpreted 
as meaning nothing other than that he's asking that we 
dress up presentation of policies in more user-friendly 
language. I'd be surprised if it meant anything more than 
that. It's true that he doesn't have the same economic,
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business background that Greiner had. That's not meant 
pejoratively, he is just different.
One of the words Fahey said should be avoided as jargon, 
if I recall rightly, was in fact 'privatisation'. And one thing 
the NSW tried to do was to sell privatisation not just as 
an accounting measure, but actually as a popular 
measure—in a similar manner to the Thatcher govern­
ment in Britain.
For years we've been saying we've got to find an alternative 
expression for privatisation. I can remember getting Peter 
Bowers to offer a lottery ticket in his column to anyone who 
could think up an expression that was more attractive, to 
describe the process of privatisation. It's a pretty ugly 
word.
“I ’ve always argued that we 
shouldn’t present 
economic rationalism as an 
end in itself ”
But is it just the word that's the problem?
I'd be surprised if it were anything more than the word, 
because the movement towards privatisation has grown 
strongly. And of all of the so-called radical Right policies 
privatisation is seen as less threatening, even by some of 
our opponents, than many of the others.
Clearly privatisation in the federal sphere often suggests 
different things to people than it does in the state sphere. 
In NSW, I think a lot of people have felt particularly 
worried about the idea because they've begun to associate 
privatisation with hospitals, but in the federal sphere 
privatisation so far has dealt with nothing more than the 
airlines and the Commonwealth Bank.
That's true. It's a result of the federal nature of our system 
that the great utilities, as Menzies would have said, are 
owned by state governments.
The point I'm getting to, I suppose, is that in the federal 
sphere so far, under Labor, privatisation has gone no 
further than to transform public monopolies into private 
monopolies, insofar as it's happened at all. Where 
privatisation does things that are seen to have more effect 
on people's lives...
I accept that. I think as far as Fahey's concerned, it's just 
that he's encouraged people to use different language. It's 
too early yet to make a judgement as to whether encourag­
ing people to use different language will be enough.
Nick Greiner was associated quite strongly with what's 
known as economic rationalism, and one of the things I 
interpreted John Fahey as saying was that economic
rationalism was not something that could be sold to the 
electorate, in the terms in which it normally talks. You 
have to find other ways to explain what you're on about. 
Other people right across the spectrum have been making 
similar noises about economic rationalism—both op­
ponents of it and people who aren't necessarily opposed, 
but who are becoming more nervous about how to sell 
the language of economic rationalism to the electorate. To 
what extent does that impact on the federal Coalition's 
agenda?
I've always argued myself that we shouldn't present 
economic rationalism as an end in itself, but as a means to 
an end, a tool. It's not some kind of desired goal, I've never 
seen it as that. I've always regarded the social equation as 
being ultimately more important than the economic one. 
My own view of Australian liberalism has always been 
influenced by that. I would have thought that what Fahey 
was encouraging people to do was to see economic 
rationalism as a means to end and not an end in itself. And 
whether he was reflecting on the approach that was taken 
by his predecessor or by anybody else, only he would 
know.
Over the last decade the Liberal Party itself has been 
transformed fairly dramatically from a traditional conser­
vative party into a pretty hard-nosed economic liberal 
party. Over that time, I would have thought there'd been 
quite a leakage of the traditional small T  liberal element 
from the party. But more recently there have been more 
voices of dissent from the more traditionally conservative 
parts of the party, as opposed to the hard-nosed 'economic 
liberal' side of the party. So while on the one hand you 
have Michael Pusey arguing from a social democratic 
perspective about the evils of economic rationalism and 
its conception of society, on the other hand Robert 
Manne, arguing from the conservative perspective, is 
saying things that sound quite similar. The problem as 
Manne sees it is that economic liberalism has taken over 
the Liberal Party, and that it no longer has any conception 
of society or, in Pusey's terms, any nation-building goals.
I've always seen Australian liberalism as being a mixture 
of classical liberalism and conservatism. It's never been— 
and this is a point I made in some of the more vigorous 
debates within the Liberal Party—a totally liberal or a 
totally conservative party in the classical sense of those two 
words. We've always been strong on individual liberty and 
the role of the individual and the inherent importance of 
individual rights which is involved in that. In some areas, 
the Liberal Party historically has been a long way ahead of 
the Labor Party in propounding certain forms of individual 
rights and opposing certain forms of discrimination—on 
the White Australia Policy, for instance.
But mixed with that individual commitment has always 
been a strong respect for traditional values. I regard myself 
as being an economic liberal and a social conservative. I 
guess in the Liberal Party there are economic liberals and 
social liberals. Then there would be the Manne group of 
economic conservatives and social conservatives. You can 
overdo these labels, and to a certain extent the distinctions 
are a bit artificial, but there's certainly some debate on the
ALR : AUGUST 1992
FEATURES 17
Right, as distinct from within the Liberal Party, about the 
amount of government intervention that's needed in the 
economy, normally centring around the debate about 
tariffs. There's really not much more to it than tariffs. 
There's no real argument on the Right, as I understand it, 
on industrial relations reform. I suppose some of the people 
who would regard themselves as part of Robert Manne's 
group are perhaps not totally enamoured of the benefits of 
financial deregulation, but it's the tariff thing more than 
anything else.
Possibly industrial policy more widely?
I'm using tariffs as a short-hand term for industry policy. 
There's a debate there, and I can understand why that 
debate has occurred. I don't share their views, but given 
the heavy deindustrialisation that's occurring at the 
present time, particularly in Victoria, the enormous struc­
tural change that's going on in manufacturing industry, it's 
perfectly understandable that we're having that kind of 
debate. One of the interesting phenomena in the Liberal 
Party is that some of the people who were economic con­
servatives—in other words they opposed too much 
deregulation—were simultaneously perhaps more liber­
tarian on social issues. The Liberal Party's changed in 
composition and in its attitudes. In 1984 the party was very 
divided about industrial relations policy. By 1986 there was 
a significant majority in favour of the policy we now have, 
and now I don't know of any dissent to that policy at all. 
So there's certainly been a shift in a very significant way.
You describe yourself as an economic liberal but a social 
conservative. From an outsider's point of view, this posi­
tion might seem somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, the economic liberalism of a possible future Hew- 
son government seems to suggest some fairly dramatic 
changes to Australian society, the outcomes of which are 
not entirely clear to a great many people.
I'm very positive about the outcomes, but I certainly agree 
that they would mean significant change. I would argue 
change for the better of course.
I
But wouldn't a lot of that potential change seem to be at 
odds with social conservatism? Might it not, for instance, 
accelerate changes that are happening in the family com­
position of society?
No, I wouldn't think so. To the extent that these policies 
reverse the process of economic decline, then they will help 
families.
But traditionally, support for families and family values 
Was tied up with some conception of at least a minimal 
Welfare state.
There's no inconsistency between our policy of economic 
rationalism and support through the tax system and other 
Pleasures to families that need it. I'm an unashamed sup­
porter of Family Allowance, I think the tax system should 
have a certain flexibility in it to help people organise their 
hves in terms of single- and double-income households.
The social conservative side of you obviously comes out 
in public debate from time to time—the flag debate for 
example, where you appeared to be quite impassioned. 
Aside from that debate, economic liberalism has been far 
more obvious in the Liberal Party's rhetoric, to the ex­
clusion of that conservative aspect, since John Hewson 
became leader.
Because John is so heavily credentialled in the economic 
area, and because the economic debate's been so central in 
the 1980s it's certainly had more publicity. The attempt to 
come to terms with some of the social dimensions of un­
employment at the party's recent convention was a 
manifestation that everyone's not just into economic solu­
tions, important though they may be.
So you don't see your liberalism, or indeed that of the 
Liberal Party, being dominated by economic liberalism 
to the exclusion of a social vision?
Menzies had a strong social vision. People deride it now; 
everything seems quaint 30 or 40 years later. If you read 
even some of Whitlam's stuff today it seems quaint. But at 
that particular time Menzies projected a social vision of 
stability and reassurance, predictability and confidence, 
and it was an atmosphere that did permeate the period.
I want to push you on this question of social values. We 
know in great detail what a Hewson government would 
do in industrial relations and a number of other areas, tax 
being one of them. But the wider social values which, as 
you say, made the Menzies aura so powerful, don't seem 
so clear. What would you see as the social values which 
a Hewson government would be propagating?
I can only speak for myself at this stage, but obviously we'd 
put the stress on individual fulfilment, self-reliance and the 
family, those three things will always be the core of 
Australian liberalism. We've always regarded them as 
more important than social benchmarks. The Liberal 
Party's rhetoric has always been much stronger on the role 
of the individual and the role of the family in our society, 
whereas the Labor Party's rhetoric has been about social 
justice and achieving certain social benchmarks. I'm not 
saying the Labor Party's disinterested in some of those 
things, or that we're disinterested in social justice, it's just 
a question of what your instinctive perception of society7s 
priorities would be.
After a term or two terms of Hewson government, how 
would you expect Australia to be better off—not just in 
terms of economic indicators, but as a society?
I think we do need a dose of self-reliance for those people 
who are able to be self-reliant. I've always recognised that 
there are people who can't look after themselves, and we 
do have a responsibility to look after them. I think we'll be 
a more individually resilient community, I think there will 
have been a shift towards people taking greater pride in 
their self-worth, self-reliance and self-fulfilment. That's 
always been a very important strand of social liberalism.
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